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I argue that democratic citizens have a duty to educate themselves politically. My 
argument proceeds in two stages. First, I establish a case for the moral importance of 
individual competence for voting, but I also maintain that the substantial content of 
the required competence must remain open. I do this by way of assessing Jason 
Brennan's provocative defense of epistocracy. I try to show that there is no notion of 
political competence that can meet with reasonable agreement among citizens and 
that voter qualification exams are therefore illegitimate. Second, I maintain that the 
basic premise of Brennan's argument, the right to a competent electorate, is valid and 
that it corresponds to an individual duty to educate oneself politically. This duty is, in 
Kant's terminology, a wide and imperfect duty that we owe to our fellow democratic 
citizens. Yet since the content of competence must be left open, this moral duty cannot 
be transformed into a legal obligation. 
 




Most of us would agree that democracy depends on education. In the words of John 
Rawls, “without widespread education in the basic aspects of constitutional 
democratic government for all citizens, and without a public informed about 
pressing problems, crucial political and social decisions simply cannot be made” 
(1997: 773). Or more precisely, decisions can certainly be made with an ill-informed 
public, but they are more likely to be bad ones, with potentially disastrous 
consequences. With that in mind, the great interest in democratic education 
recently is unsurprising. The focus of that interest has usually been on either the 
prudence or the obligation of the state, schools or parents to provide the education 
necessary for democratic participation. However, I would argue that it is also the 
responsibility of the individual citizen to acquire that education. We owe it to our 
fellow citizens to educate ourselves politically. 
The present article consists of two parts. In the first part, I establish a prima facie 
case for the moral importance of individual competence for democratic 
participation, but also that the substantial content of the required competence is 
open-ended. I do this by way of assessing Jason Brennan’s provocative argument 
against universal suffrage (Brennan 2011). Brennan adopts a principle of 
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competence asserting that citizens have a right to a competent electorate, which in 
turn leads him to support a version of epistocracy.1 I shall argue that his argument is 
not valid, due to the disputed nature of the required competence. Reasonable 
disagreement about competence leads to reasonable disagreement about any voter 
exam. This does not mean that the notion of competence is morally irrelevant, but it 
means that the content of the required competence is best thought of as open-
ended. In the second part, I argue that the basic premise of Brennan’s argument, the 
right to a competent electorate, holds true in the sense that we have a moral right to 
expect others to base their participation in democratic decision-making on relevant 
knowledge. Moreover, this legitimate expectation gives rise to an individual duty on 
behalf of citizens: the democratic duty to educate oneself politically.2 I then outline 
the main features of the duty to educate oneself: what kind of duty it is; who owes it 
and to whom; what is owed and how much; and what follows if the duty is not 
discharged. By exploiting some of Kant’s moral vocabulary, I argue that the political 
duty to educate oneself is a wide and imperfect duty that we owe to our fellow 
democratic citizens.3 
I shall make two assumptions. First, I shall assume that citizens do have some 
influence on policy through political participation, such as voting. Otherwise, it 
would hardly be a democracy. That does not mean that citizens have all the power: 
modern democracies are characterized by a complex epistemic division of labor, 
where experts, bureaucracies, and political parties, to name a few, also play 
important roles. Hence, citizens’ input is only a part, albeit an important part, of the 
collective decision-making process. I argue that even that limited part is significant 
enough to be accompanied by civic obligations. Second, I shall assume that basing 
decisions on better knowledge will usually lead to better decisions in the long run, 
so that widespread voter ignorance is at least a problem (Somin 2015). I shall leave 
the precise meaning of “better knowledge” open for now, for reasons that will soon 
become clear, and I shall also leave open what “better decisions” means: it can be 
read as “decisions contributing to a good and just society”, where the precise 
meaning of “good and just” is left open for the reader to fill in, according to his or 
her convictions. 
 
1. The Problem of Competence 
I shall start by outlining Jason Brennan’s argument against universal suffrage. The 
first premise of that argument is that to vote is to exercise significant power over 
others. This claim has three aspects. First, to vote is to exercise power. Collectively, 
voters create or uphold laws that are imposed on citizens by force. Even democratic 
governments threaten violence in order to induce compliance with their laws. 
Second, to vote is to exercise significant power. The significance of our individual 
vote may be negligible, but collectively, voting can do great harm.4 Elected 
governments can alter citizens’ life prospects in dramatic and even disastrous ways, 
for instance, through waging wars or making economic policy. Third, to vote is to 
exercise significant power over others. In voting, we make decisions not only for 
ourselves, but for others. And whereas we may have a basic right to have a say in 
matters concerning ourselves, a corresponding basic right to govern others does not 
seem to exist. This power needs to be justified. 
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The second basic premise of Brennan’s argument is what he calls the principle of 
competence: “Citizens have a right that any political power held over them should be 
exercised by competent people in a competent way” (2011: 700). Brennan’s 
justification for this principle proceeds mainly by analogy to the case of juries, to 
which we shall return. It follows from these two premises that we have a right to a 
competent electorate, and that incompetent voting is unjust. Hence, we owe it to 
each other to exercise the right to vote in a competent manner. That is the core of 
Brennan’s argument. 
Obviously, a lot hangs on the meaning of “competence”. Although Brennan does 
not give us a detailed account, we can deduce from his text three dimensions of 
competence. First, being competent includes having the requisite relevant 
knowledge, the opposite of which is ignorance. Second, being competent includes a 
certain quality of reasoning: how you assess evidence, draw inferences, and so on. 
The opposite is irrationality. Third, competence includes a moral component: voters 
should be reasonable. That is not to say that we must have the correct moral beliefs, 
but it invokes a common idea within political or public reason liberalism, such as 
the core idea of Rawls’ version of political liberalism. However, Brennan wants to 
leave the content of “reasonable” open, “to be filled in by the truth, whatever that 
is”, apart from noting that reasonableness excludes patent moral failings like racism 
(Brennan 2011: 705). His argument is therefore assumed to hold independently of 
any specific conception of moral reasonableness.  
The controversial parts of Brennan’s argument come from what he thinks the 
principle of competence implies. His argument would be philosophically significant, 
but practically inconsequential if all voters were competent. Yet Brennan brings his 
philosophical argument to bear on an empirical claim: Many citizens are 
incompetent, in the sense of ignorant, irrational, and/or unreasonable (2007). Even 
this claim would not be overly radical if the right to vote took precedence over the 
right to a competent electorate. Yet Brennan holds that if citizens are not 
competent, they ought to be excluded from holding political power, including the 
power to vote. Only citizens of sufficient political competence should be allowed to 
vote. Epistocracy is more just than democracy. 
Brennan’s conclusions are provocative and hard to swallow. He provides us with 
two sets of considerations to make them more palatable. 
The first is the jury analogy. Like voters, jurors wield significant power. Their 
decisions can have serious consequences for the defendant’s life prospects. In a jury 
context, however, we already accept something like the principle of competence. 
Imagine that the jury is ignorant (jurors pay no attention during the trial and are 
ignorant of what the case is about), irrational (jurors make their decision “not on 
the basis of the evidence, but on the basis of wishful thinking and various bizarre 
conspiracy theories”) or unreasonable (the jury finds the defendant guilty because 
he is black, gay, or Muslim) (Brennan 2011: 703). To knowingly enforce decisions 
made from these kinds of serious epistemic or moral failings would be unjust. 
Hence, we rightly take steps to avoid such incompetencies in a jury context.  
In the political context, however, many voters do the equivalent of the above 
juror incompetencies without anyone calling for them to be disenfranchised (except 
Brennan). We acknowledge the right of defendants to competent juries, but not the 
right of citizens to competent voters, even though the decisions voters make are just 
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as serious, perhaps even more so. Brennan asks us to consider the political parallels 
to the juries above: The ignorant electorate, where voters pay no attention to the 
details of the election, have little or less knowledge of the issues at stake, and in 
effect choose their candidate at random; the irrational electorate, where voters pay 
some attention and have some knowledge of the issues, but vote “on the basis of 
wishful thinking and various disreputable social scientific theories they happen to 
believe”; and the unreasonable electorate, where voters choose the white candidate 
rather than the black out of sheer racism (Brennan 2011: 708). Voters like this exist, 
and may even admit it openly, but still, Brennan notes, nobody seems to bother 
about the injustice of having such voters participate in decision-making with 
potentially serious effects for other citizens. 
The second strategy that Brennan employs to break down our resistance to his 
epistocratic conclusion is the argument from children. Epistocracy seems 
outrageous to us because we associate it with earlier practices of restricted suffrage, 
in particular the racist literacy tests in some American states in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Brennan argues that although people used to be excluded from 
voting for morally irrelevant reasons (sex or color), that does not make it wrong to 
exclude them for morally relevant reasons (competence). The moral relevance of 
competence is salient from the fact that we already deny a significant part of the 
population the right to vote because they are deemed incompetent: namely, 
children. Many adults are however less competent than many children, and instead 
of setting the limit arbitrarily at a certain age, we should rather restrict the right to 
vote to those who are deemed competent, Brennan argues. Competence, regardless 
of age, is the morally relevant limiting factor. 
We can argue against Brennan’s position in several ways. Some of them will take 
us deeply into general political philosophy.5 Since my interest is primarily in the 
political philosophy of education, I shall here consider only one type of criticism, 
revolving around the concept of competence. Hopefully, this criticism will be 
sufficient to at least force a modification of Brennan’s claim. 
Brennan himself discusses a criticism arising from what he, following Estlund, 
calls the qualified acceptability requirement. This principle requires that “any basis 
for the distribution of political power must be justifiable to all qualified points of 
view” (Brennan 2011: 701).6 Brennan notes that one way to implement his version 
of epistocracy would be by way of a voter qualification exam, which would test 
citizens for relevant competence: “The purpose of the exam would be to exclude 
badly incompetent citizens from voting, by screening out citizens who are badly 
misinformed or ignorant about the election” (2011: 714). Yet Estlund had earlier 
argued that such an exam would violate the qualified acceptability requirement: We 
cannot expect all, even all reasonable people, to agree on such a test (Estlund 2008: 
33). 
Brennan grants that epistocracy violates the qualified acceptability 
requirement—to a degree. He argues, however, that democracy and epistocracy are 
in the same boat in that they each violate one basic principle, the competence 
principle and the qualified acceptability requirement, respectively. Yet violating the 
competence principle is the more unjust of the two, he claims. We cannot go into 
the details of that comparison here.7 It is more important for our purposes that in 
his comparison of the relative injustice of the various violations, he seems to ignore 
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the deeper aspect of how epistocracy violates the qualified acceptability 
requirement. It is not just the voting test that will have trouble meeting that 
requirement, but the underlying account of competence itself. Earlier on Brennan 
states, “We cannot expect all reasonable people to agree on where the line should be 
drawn between competence and incompetence” (2011: 714). Yet later he writes as 
though the problem was merely one of agreeing about a test. In doing so, Brennan 
may underestimate the depth of the voter exam’s violation of the qualified 
acceptability requirement. The problem is not merely one of constructing an 
acceptable test, but that there will be a partly political disagreement about what 
competence to require. 
The problem may at first be approached as a threshold problem. How much does 
someone need to know in order to count as competent? How do we decide where to 
draw the line between pass and fail, competent and incompetent? In school settings, 
there are two ways of doing that. The first is to decide on a particular distribution in 
advance, say, a normal distribution. Under these conditions, someone who passed 
this year may be less competent than someone who failed last year. The other 
method is to develop criteria for passing: any graduate should know this and that. It 
is then an open question how many will pass the exam in a given year: none may 
pass, or everyone may pass. This second method must be the one that Brennan has 
in mind. Yet what are the criteria for using certain benchmarks instead of others? 
Within a school setting there are ways of answering that question. In some cases, the 
threshold is set by external standards, for instance what is necessary to do a proper 
job. In medicine, a future nurse must be able to take a blood test without killing the 
patient. In other cases, standards within a scholarly community provide the 
threshold. All philosophers think all philosophers should know certain things about 
Plato and Kant. In most cases a mix of internal and external standards probably 
applies. Yet regarding voter competence, no external standards and no expert 
community exist. There is no external standard because we have different ideas of 
what a proper society is, and there is no expert community apart from the people 
themselves. 
This lack of standards and experts leads us to the deeper problem: there is 
reasonable disagreement about what should be known in order to take part in 
governing others through voting. Brennan may say that without an elementary 
understanding of economics you would lack something crucial for governing. 
Others might reply that without having immersed yourself in literature you would 
lack a capacity for empathy that is even more important for governing. And so on. 
Admittedly, the economist and the man of letters might agree on a disjunctive 
account: a voter will have to know either economics or literature. That helps a little, 
but not much. Some might repudiate the disjunctive account and argue that their 
favored candidate item for inclusion in the voter exam should be compulsory. 
Certain areas of knowledge might also be considered positively harmful. A Marxist 
might find a classical economist to be incompetent, not primarily due to a lack of 
knowledge, but precisely because of his so-called knowledge. The question here is 
not whether the Marxist is right in this, but whether his position is within the 
bounds of reasonable disagreement, which I think it is. 
There is also reasonable disagreement regarding the second dimension of 
competence mentioned above. The debate about whether citizens can legitimately 
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rely on religious reasons in politics can, for instance, be seen as a debate about the 
content of political competence. Does using the Bible as a source of reasons and 
evidence count as irrationality and thereby as incompetence? If we assume that 
political philosophers are reasonable, the debate within political philosophy about 
religion and public reason indicates that we are here dealing with reasonable 
disagreement about the criteria for competence and incompetence. 
One might further argue that the most relevant knowledge, for example about 
poverty or racism, is not factual or theoretical but experiential or practical. To 
misuse Russell’s famous distinction, is knowledge by description or knowledge by 
acquaintance more important in a political context? Those who know in one sense 
(they have read about it) may not know in another sense (they have not felt it on 
their bodies), and vice versa. It is hard to discern an obvious answer to how much of 
the first (or second) type of knowledge is needed to compensate for a lack of the 
other type. Once again, the claim is not that knowledge by acquaintance is 
necessary, but that it can be reasonably argued that it is, and that a voter test 
therefore violates the qualified acceptability requirement. Likewise, the point is not 
just that testing for practical or experiential knowledge is difficult, but that 
disagreement exists regarding the competence that the exam should test. Even if 
inventive psychologists manage to devise an exam that tested reliably for this second 
type of knowledge, the underlying problem of how important it is to the required 
competence would remain. 
This disagreement is also reflected among political philosophers, for instance in 
controversies over democratic citizenship and civic education. Elizabeth Anderson 
argues that those who are most competent or qualified to lead in a democratic 
society must be “systematically responsive to the interests and concerns of people 
from all walks of life” (2007: 596). To be responsive in this way requires avoiding 
cognitive biases and group stereotyping. This can only be effectively avoided by 
personal experience—academic or propositional knowledge is not sufficient. 
Therefore, the democratic leadership must draw its members from a variety of 
social and cultural backgrounds. Importantly, Anderson holds diversity of 
background to be part of the competence of the most competent. Bluntly put, having 
a disadvantaged background can be an epistemic advantage in a democracy. 
I suspect that the problems are even graver when we turn to the moral 
component of competence. However, Brennan’s strategy of leaving open the 
meaning of both “reasonable” and “qualified” makes it hard to start a productive 
discussion about whether any conception of moral reasonableness can meet the 
qualified acceptability requirement. Besides, even assuming such a conception, it is 
hard to see how one could construct a test for moral reasonableness that would not 
be fairly easy to fake the correct answers on. Of course, more sophisticated 
psychological tests can detect racism and implicit bias, for instance, but the more 
sophisticated the tests, the higher the probability that there is qualified disagreement 
about them. 
To sum up, the problem is not just a matter of devising an exam that tracks “the 
real difference between competence and incompetence,” but that there is reasonable 
disagreement about what that real difference consists in. It is not just the test itself 
that gets into trouble with the qualified acceptability requirement, but also what it is 
to be a test of. So the problem with voter exams is not just one of tracking a 
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distinction that all reasonable people accept in a way that not all reasonable people 
can accept, but that there may not really be a distinction that all reasonable people 
can accept.8 
 
2. The Duty to Educate Oneself 
In an earlier paper on the same topic, Brennan stated that it was “a piece of moral 
philosophy, not a manual for civic education” (2009: 547). The concerns raised 
above should make us doubt whether a detailed manual could ever meet the 
qualified acceptability requirement and thus be made compulsory for voting. Still, 
Brennan’s argument is a reminder that civic education is necessary for responsible 
voting, and that we may have understated the duties that accompany democratic 
participation, including voting. By arguing forcefully that individuals have a right to 
a competent electorate, he also points us towards a corresponding individual duty, 
and thus that acquiring civic education is partly the responsibility of the citizen 
herself. 
A great deal of concern about democratic education has been raised in the last 
couple of decades. Insofar as it has been thought of as a duty, however, it is 
ordinarily understood as the duty of others (state, schools, or parents) to provide 
that education, and the right of the individual (child or citizen) to receive it. My 
claim now is that democratic citizens also have a duty to educate themselves, in both 
the epistemic and ethical senses mentioned above. Let us call this the democratic 
duty to educate oneself politically. I suggest, though, that given the wide, deep and 
reasonable disagreement noted above about what and how much knowledge to 
require, it is best to think of the content of this duty as open: there are many 
different ways to fulfill it. The duty must therefore be formulated as a duty to 
acquire the type and amount of knowledge one genuinely and reasonably thinks is 
necessary to fulfill the principle of competence. 
The first question that arises here is whether this is a duty to educate oneself or a 
duty to try to educate oneself. This trades on an ambivalence in the concept of 
education. If we restrict the concept of education to processes where we acquire 
truths and not only beliefs, we must formulate the democratic duty as the duty to 
make an effort to educate oneself, since individuals may work hard to educate 
themselves about current affairs, but still end up believing many falsehoods, 
through no fault of their own. In that case, the citizen has still shown his or her 
fellow citizens the requisite respect. It is, rather, irresponsible ignorance that shows 
disrespect for one’s fellow citizens (2006, pp. 456-458). For the sake of simplicity, 
though, I shall continue to talk about the duty to educate oneself, although if we 
have the narrower concept of education in the back of our minds, it should be read 
as the duty to make a serious effort at educating oneself, within the limits of one’s 
natural talents and practical constraints.9  
To my knowledge, the explicit claim that we have a duty to educate ourselves is 
quite rare. When we do meet claims of this kind, they are usually only mentioned in 
passing. A case in point is Kenneth Lawson. He states that “[we] are morally obliged 
to be lifelong learners”, and that this duty is both “a consequence of citizenship” and 
“a condition of citizenship” (2007: 109). This seems superficially similar to the point 
I am trying to make. Unfortunately, Lawson does not follow up and expand on it, so 
whether it is also substantially similar is difficult to tell. Kenneth Wain (1991) is 
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another example. He argues that it is a “duty of membership in the human 
community” to educate oneself (Wain 1991: 276). Like Lawson, however, Wain does 
not elaborate on what this duty consists in and on what grounds it rests. The little 
he says indicates an economic rather than a political justification: in a fast-changing 
and increasingly technological society, a constant willingness to learn and develop is 
necessary for productive membership in the community.  
The one philosophical context where we regularly find claims about the duty to 
educate oneself is in connection with Kant’s notion of duties to oneself. The duty to 
educate oneself follows naturally from Kant’s assertion that we owe it to ourselves to 
cultivate our natural powers, both physical and rational, as well as our moral powers 
(Wood, 2009). This Kantian duty of self-perfection has been employed to argue that 
we have a duty to ourselves to educate ourselves (Wain 1991). Yet my claim is 
different in an important respect. The duty to educate oneself politically is a duty 
towards others, arising out of an ideal of democratic citizenship. I shall now try to 
shed light on this duty by locating it within Kant’s taxonomy of duties in The 
Metaphysics of Morals (1991), although I do not mean to assume the truth of 
Kantian moral philosophy as a whole.  
The overarching division in Kant’s taxonomy of duties is between juridical duties 
and ethical duties. Juridical duties can be coercively enforced, in particular through 
legal regulations, whereas ethical duties cannot. While the public can constrain the 
individual to comply with juridical duties, the individual must constrain himself to 
comply with ethical duties. The gist of the previous section was that the right to a 
competent electorate cannot be translated into a corresponding juridical duty, to be 
enforced, for instance, by mandatory voter exams. The duty to educate oneself 
politically must therefore be understood as an ethical duty, which does not imply 
the right of the state to compel adherence. For such compulsion to be legitimate, it 
would have to satisfy the qualified acceptability requirement, which, we have seen, it 
does not do. 
Ethical duties to others are further divided into duties of respect and duties of 
love. The essence of duties of respect is that they are owed. Others do not have to 
show gratitude for your kindness when you comply with a duty of respect. You 
cannot claim merit for fulfilling it, but are to be blamed if you do not. Duties of love, 
on the other hand, are not something you owe anyone. Fulfilling such duties is 
merely meritorious, and failing to do so is not blameworthy. This distinction is 
often taken to correspond to the distinction between strict (perfect) and wide 
(imperfect) duties (Wood, 2009). Strict duties admit no exception; there are quite 
specific actions that they require or forbid. They correspond to maxims that are not 
even conceivable as universalized. Wide duties, on the other hand, are much more 
flexible in what they demand of us. They do not require specific actions but rather 
the pursuit of certain ends that leave the when, how and to what degree up to us. 
These duties correspond to maxims that are conceivable as universalized, but that 
we cannot rationally implement as universal laws. These two divisions, between 
strict and wide duties and between duties of respect and duties of love, are often 
taken to overlap, on the following ground: Since wide duties do not require 
particular actions, but rather that we adopt a certain end, performing particular 
actions to further the obligatory end is merely meritorious, and omitting any of 
them is not blameworthy. 
 
Bøyum S. Etikk i praksis. Nord J Appl Ethics (2018), 12(2), 129–141 137 
However, the democratic duty to educate oneself cuts across these two divisions. 
On the one hand, educating oneself is a duty of respect. We owe it to our fellow 
democratic citizens to exercise political power competently. If we do not even make 
an effort at educating ourselves politically, we show them contempt. Showing 
respect is not merely a good thing to do, but something we owe others. On the other 
hand, it is also a wide duty. As argued above, the democratic duty to educate oneself 
politically does not have a specific content. It gives us wide latitude to decide for 
ourselves how to discharge it. It directs us to adopt a policy, as it were, but does not 
specify how or when or to what degree we must implement it, whether, for instance, 
we should do so by immersing ourselves in economic theory, travelling the world, 
or reading newspapers. One cannot therefore be blamed for omitting any particular 
actions to further the obligatory end. It is not merely meritorious, however, to adopt 
the end. Refusing to care about the end at all is blameworthy. 
But if the content of the obligation is unspecified, it seems as though we can 
never know whether or not someone is pursuing that end. Can a man argue, for 
example, that he is educating himself politically by drinking beer and watching 
Baywatch? Hardly, since “unspecified” does not mean that we have no means of 
passing judgement. Compare with the duty of beneficence: there is great latitude 
here in what the duty demands. Sometimes you discharge that duty by helping 
others out, and at other times by not helping them and letting them manage on their 
own. That does not exclude particular situations arising where we can say definitely 
that someone failed to comply with the duty. Likewise, not everything will count as 
discharging the democratic duty to educate oneself, since not everything will count 
as the required political education. One has to be able to tell a coherent and 
convincing story about how a pattern of activities can be seen as fulfilling the duty 
to educate oneself politically. Although a sophisticated viewer may see reality game 
shows as political allegories and thereby claim to educate himself by watching them, 
that explanation will not normally do. Perhaps no general rules can be formulated 
in advance, but in particular situations we can still determine whether the obligatory 
end has been set as an end. That a duty is wide does not mean that anything goes. 
Yet despite the argument from the first half of the paper, to the effect that no 
specific rules can be given as valid for all, we can list some activities that may 
typically promote the relevant political education. In my fairly traditional opinion 
one should: follow political debate in serious news media; read some important 
political documents, such as white papers; and study some social science, be it 
economy, sociology or political science, even if only through popular books. Yet I 
can also easily imagine a good case being made for other areas of study, like history 
or law. Even the natural sciences may be politically relevant, such as climate science. 
A case can also be made for art. Martha Nussbaum has famously argued that fiction 
can develop your capacity for empathy in a way that is politically important, even 
necessary. Others again will emphasize the importance of practical experience: 
work, travel, or talking to people from all walks of life. Even thinking can constitute 
a political education, either through reflection on the political significance of 
personal experience, or by thinking things through in the manner of political 
philosophy. The possibilities are almost endless. Not everything will count, of 
course. You need a reasonable justification, which is not to say an unassailable 
proof, for why the activity in question promotes the knowledge or understanding 
necessary for political participation.  
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A wide duty may seem lax, because of the variety of ways in which it can be 
discharged. Yet that very same laxity makes wide duties especially taxing, since no 
fixed point exists at which you can say that you have done your duty—it threatens 
to become an endless task. How much is required to fulfill a wide duty? It does not 
seem reasonable to demand “as much as possible”. Biological needs, such as sleep 
and other duties, such as taking care of one’s children must be considered. Perhaps 
one also has a legitimate right, if not a duty, to look after one’s own happiness. The 
duty to educate yourself politically does not command you to sit up at night or 
neglect your children in order to read white papers. Yet what reasons are acceptable 
for declining to perform actions that promote the democratic duty to educate 
oneself? We can here distinguish between a rigorous and a lenient view.10 
A rigorous view would be that one should do as much as possible to promote a 
wide duty, provided it does not come into conflict with other duties. If the wide 
duty comes into conflict with a strict duty, the latter will take priority. If it comes 
into conflict with other wide duties, we must strike a balance between them as well 
as we can, in accordance with their weight and significance. Yet even if this view 
does not demand that we spend all our time on political education, it is still quite 
rigorous in that it demands that we spends all our time on fulfilling duties. 
Admittedly, there may be overlap between activities promoting wide duties and 
activities promoting one’s own happiness (Baron & Fahmy, 2009: 222). Some people 
enjoy politics, after all. Nevertheless, it may still seem overly moralistic, in the sense 
that we are asked to justify everything we do in moral terms. 
A lenient view would be that concern for one’s own happiness is allowed to take 
precedence over any particular wide duty. Obviously, even this view would require 
us to comply with strict duties, but it would permit sacrificing the promotion of 
wide duties when it conflicts with the pursuit of happiness. On this view, then, the 
democratic duty to educate oneself politically can be set aside not only when it 
collides with other duties, but also when it collides with the concern for one’s 
happiness. Even if the lenient view does not allow you to completely reject the 
obligatory aim, but merely to postpone it, we may still suspect that it threatens to 
evaporate the wide duties, including the duty to educate oneself politically. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the rigorous view is too rigorous and the lenient 
view too lenient. A moderately rigorous view seems to me the most plausible. This 
view will, like the rigorous view, hold that the various claims on us have to be 
balanced, but like the lenient view it will also leave room for the pursuit of 
happiness. It combines these by holding that the concern for happiness is one of 
those concerns that have to be balanced, as though it were a duty.11 Moreover, this 
moderate view obliges us to seek out a reasonable balance, and that cannot mean to 
give all weight to one or two concerns. Each duty should be given some weight, 
though leaving latitude for us to balance them in accordance with our personality, 
our situation and the moral weight of the duties. Letting a tiny increase in 
momentary happiness outweigh any wide duty is not striking a reasonable balance, 
nor is it a reasonable balance to stop taking care of your children in favor of reading 
political philosophy all night. Still, it would be inappropriate to insist on precise 
rules here. 
One obvious argument against this notion of the democratic duty to educate 
oneself says that if citizens are not competent, it is not their fault. Rather, it is the 
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state and/or the parents that have failed in some way. Education generally, or at 
least the necessary democratic education, should be the responsibility of the state 
and/or the parents. Yet two wrongs do not make a right. One might agree that in an 
ideal world the state and/or the parents would take care of the required democratic 
education. If they do not, however, we still have to deal with the violations of the 
right to a competent electorate that occur in the non-ideal world. The correct 
response to that problem is to hold the individual at least partly responsible for his 
or her own political education, although we might disagree about how great that 
part is. Yet acknowledging such a part is sufficient for the argument developed here. 
Clearly, children do not bear that responsibility themselves. In their case, the 
duty falls on the state and/or the parents to provide the necessary education. Yet 
since we are now dealing with a moral duty and not a legal requirement, we do not 
have do decide upon a particular age when that duty arises. It seems reasonable to 
assume that it is a gradual process. You are hardly responsible for your education at 
all when you are seven years old, more responsible at fifteen, and largely responsible 
for it at twenty-three. As you grow up, you gradually take over more and more of 
the responsibility for your own education, and in a complex and rapidly changing 
world that education is never finished. This is not to deny that others, e.g. 
represented by the state, have a duty to provide the right conditions even for adults 
to acquire or continue their education, for instance through support for libraries or 
serious news media. 
The democratic duty to educate oneself politically is a duty you owe to others, by 
virtue of taking part in collective government, if only through voting. Yet if a citizen 
does not fulfill that duty, should she then abstain from voting? In an earlier paper, 
Brennan (2009) argued that incompetent citizens should voluntarily refrain from 
voting, but not that they should be denied the right to vote. Although the present 
paper implies that Brennan should have kept to this earlier view, such cases can be 
difficult. Consider the following: Your wife is very well informed. You normally 
agree with her. She tells you how to vote. Yet you yourself have not made any effort 
to learn about the candidates and their policies. In this case, you have not fulfilled 
your duty to educate yourself, but should you abstain from voting? Analysis and 
argument can sometimes settle hard cases like these, but grey areas may remain. 
However, for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient that there can be some clear 
cases where the duty is not fulfilled. People should be free to watch game shows 
instead of serious news, but if they almost always watch the former and rarely the 
latter and take no other steps to inform themselves, they should ask themselves in 
earnest whether they have made the necessary effort, and whether acting on their 




1 “Epistocracy” refers to a political society where knowledge and competence are 
legal conditions for holding political power. 
2 The notion of education used in this paper does not refer exclusively or even 
primarily to formal education. 
3 To a somewhat more limited extent, I think it also applies to non-democratic 
societies. 
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4 We cannot go into the extensive literature on whether it is irrational to vote (since 
each single vote does not, on its own, make any difference), as it quickly gets too 
technical. The important point for our purposes is that even if our personal 
influence is zero, there are moral principles governing our participation in collective 
activities (Brennan 2012: 2). Caesar’s 60 murderers were all responsible for his 
death, even if he would equally well have been killed by 59. It should also be noted 
that the fact that the effect of the individual vote is negligible is primarily a dilemma 
for the consequentialist: how can something be right or wrong, obligatory or 
impermissible, if it is of no consequence. In a deontological framework, where 
something like the categorical imperative is central, it is of less moral relevance (it is 
obviously of relevance, though, that voting has effect collectively). 
5 One might, for instance, argue that Brennan’s conclusion conflicts with the basic 
moral ideas of democracy, for instance as formulated by Rawls: the conception of 
society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons (Brennan 
could reply, however, that those basic moral ideas support his conclusions). Another 
strategy would be to argue that Brennan should have concluded, not with 
epistocracy, but a minimal state, since it may be argued that whereas epistocracy will 
reduce incompetent voters’ authority in matters concerning both themselves and 
others, a minimal state will only reduce their authority over others. 
6 I will follow Brennan in speaking interchangeably about “qualified disagreement” 
(Estlund) and “reasonable disagreement” (Rawls), since they are closely related and 
the differences do not matter much for my argument. For the sake of argument, we 
will, like Brennan and Estlund, leave open for now what counts as “qualified”. 
Brennan discusses this objection more thoroughly in “Epistocracy Within Public 
Reason” (2014). 
7 The comparison also rests on a consequentialist argument: epistocracy would lead 
to better consequences, better decisions, than democracy. 
8 Brennan would probably reply that voter exams and voting age laws are in the 
same moral boat in this respect. They are both attempts to “track a morally 
important distinction which all reasonable people could accept, but would do so 
imperfectly, in a way which not all reasonable people could accept” (Brennan 2011: 
719). We cannot go into the issue of children’s suffrage here, but suffice it to say that 
I am not fully convinced that competence is the sole, or even the primary, 
justification for denying children the vote. Moreover, there may be additional 
reasons for criticizing Brennan’s comparisons of the relative injustice of voting age 
laws and voter exams. Indeed, I really wonder whether one can fruitfully make these 
comparisons in a single page or two. For instance, does it matter to the degree of 
injustice of voting exams if performance on these turned out to be largely genetic? 
Does it matter that historically oppressed groups may fail the exam more often than 
privileged groups? Or that well-off families would be able to provide for their 
offspring something like the Princeton Review, a company offering test preparation 
to help with college admission, thus assisting them to pass the voter exam? These 
are deep and difficult questions, but they are the types of questions that have to be 
answered in order to determine whether voting exam laws are more or less just than 
voting age laws. 
9 Note that Brennan does not concern himself with the limits of natural talents: 
those falling under the threshold should not vote, period, notwithstanding whether 
it is due to a lack of effort or lack of talent. My concern, though, is with the duty to 
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educate oneself. If we accept that "ought" implies "can' in this area at least, we must 
add “within the limits of one’s natural talents.” 
10 The following discussion is indebted to Baron and Seymour Fahmy’s (2009) 
discussion of how much latitude Kant allows for the duty of beneficence. 
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